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1.  INTRODUCTION 
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For  some  years  the  Commission  has  conducted  exercises  of  consulta-
tion  and  analysis  with  the  objective  of  inducing  a  progressive 
harmonisation  of  the  safety  requirements  and  criteria  applied  to 
nuclear  installations  in  the  Community.  The  Commission's  aim  in 
pursuing  this  work  has  been  to  ensure  that  as  far  as  possible  the 
safety  criteria  to  which  each  nuclear  installation  is  designed, 
constructed  and  operated  enjoy  the  benefit  of  review  and  possible 
refinement  in  the  light  of  the  whole  competence  and  experience  of 
the designers,  constructor,  operators  and  safety authorities of the 
Community.  The  intended  programme  of  actions  to  achieve  this  aim 
was  proposed  to  the  Council  and  to  the  Parliament  and  was  endorsed 
by  the  Council  in its resolution of  22  July  1975.(*) 
At  this  time,  when  the  incident  at  Chernobyl  has  re-emphasised  the 
importance  of  effective measures  to  secure  and  maintain  the  safety 
of  nuclear  installations, it is pertinent  to  review  the  experience 
of  implementing  the  programme,  to  report  upon  its achievements  and 
its  problems,  to  indicate  those  actions  which  require  continuing 
effort  and  to  suggest  supplementary  actions  which  should  be  under-
taken.  The  Commission  indicated,  in  its  general  communication  on 
Chernobyl  (**),  its  intention  to  address  these  areas:  that  inten-
tion is fulfilled  i.n  this communication. 
In  the  analysis  presented  in  this  Communication,  the  emphasis  has 
been  put  upon  the  principal  objective . of  the  above  mentioned 
Council Resolution,  i.e.  "to provide  an  equivalent  and  satisfactory 
degree  of  protection  of  the  population  and  of  the  environment 
against  the  risks  of  radiation  resulting  from  nuclear  activities 
and  at  the  same  time  to  assist  the  development  of  trade  on  the 
understanding  that  such  harmonization  should  not  involve  any 
lowering  of  the safety level already attained". 
This  objective is still valid,  but  the ways  and  means  of  fulfilling 
it must  take  into  account  the  experience  accumulated  in the  course 
of  implementation of this Council Resolution as well  as  the  lessons 
from  major  events  such  as  Three Mile  Island incident. 
Consequently  the  actions  recommended  in  the  final  section  of  this 
Communication  go  beyond  the  continuation  of  the  harmonization 
process,  and  represent  a  comprehensive  approach,  which  is  more 
adapted  to  the present situation. 
2.  INTRODUCTORY  REMARKS  ON  TECHNOLOGICAL  SAFETY 
2.1  "safety philosophy  and  licensing procedures  of nuclear reactors 
(*) 
(**) 
The  main  actors  in  a  licensing  procedure  are  the utility, which  is 
responsible  for  the  safety  submission,  the  constructor who  designs 
and  supplies  the  plant  to  the utility and  the  licensing authority. 
This latter is the guardian of the public interest in safety and  is 
provided  with  wide  powers  for  regulation  and  enforcement  in  the 
national context.  Research organisations have  a.  subsidiary but 
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vital  role  in  providing  the  scientific  evidence  upon  which  the 
proposed  design  and  operating  solutions  are  based.  The  Commission 
of  the  European  Communities,  by  virtue  of  Euratom  Community's 
Research  and  Development  programmes  in Nuclear Safety and Radiation 
Protection  contributes  to  the  generation  of  the  scientific  evi-
dence,  but  has  no direct role in the licensing procedure and  in the 
regulatory field.  (*) 
Nuclear  reactors  have  so  far  been  designed  and  licensed  on  the 
basis  of  a  set  of  requirements  for  normal  operation  and  of  a 
predetermined  set  of  accidents  (**),  the  so-called  "design  basis 
accidents",  considered  to  lie within  a  sufficiently  low  range  of 
probability  of  occurrence  and  to  be  the  extreme  cases  of  certain 
types  of  accident.  In  this  way,  designing  against  the  extreme 
cases  should  automatically cover  the less severe accidents. 
More  severe  accidents with  a  still lower  probability of  occurrence 
than  the  design  basis  accidents  need  not  be  catered  for  by  the 
design,  since  all  design  basis  accidents  contain  already  the 
multiple  combination  of  different  unrelated  and  unlikely  events, 
but  their effects  upon  the  containment  structures  and  consequences 
upon  the  environment  and  the  population  must  be  assessed  in  order 
to detect possible cost effective solutions even against  them. 
To  this endeavour probabilistic safety analysis methodologies  (***) 
have  been  increasingly used  over  the  last  10  years  as  a  complemen-
tary tool for designing  and  licensing e.g.  to assess  the risks  from 
accidents  more  severe  than  the  design  basis  accident  and  for 
assessing  different  technical  solutions  of  a  given  safety  problem 
·on  a  comparative  basis  and  to  detect  the  cost  effective  solutions 
mentioned  before.  Furthermore  they  are  beginning  to  be  used  for 
assessing  the  probability  of  a  given  critical  occurrence,  such  as 
the  probability  of  a  core  melt,  also  for  reactors  which  have  been 
already  built,  for  the  purpose  of  intercomparison  and  for  identi-
fying  optimal strategies of backfitting. 
The  overall  protection  against  nuclear  risks  has  two  quite  diffe-
rent aspects  : 
- the  first  is  related  to  environmental  pollution  considerations, 
i.e.  to  the  release  of  radioactivity  in  the  atmosphere  or  in 
liquid effluents during normal operation. 
These  release rates are set as  targets  (****)  in the design phase 
and  their  achievement  can  be  actually  measured  in  a  continuous 
manner  during  the  life  of  the  reactor.  The  public  understand 
this  aspect  relatively  easily  and  it is  in  general  recognised 
that  the  routine  releases  of  radioactivity  during  normal  opera-
tion of nuclear reactors  do  not  pose major problems. 
The  Council  Directives  issued  in  implementation  of  Title  II, 
Chapter  III,  of  the  Euratom  Treaty  and  concerning  the  basic 
safety  standards  are,  of  course,  incorporated  in national  legis-
lat.ions. 
(**) 
(***) 
(****) 
For this reason this approach is called "deterministic" 
The "probabilistic approach" 
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- the  second  is  related  to  nuclear  safety in  the  proper  sense  i.e. 
to  the  release of radioactivity in accidental  conditions.  At  the 
extreme  end  of  the  class  .of  accidental  conditions  there  are 
severe  accidents·  involving  the  partial  or  total  destruction  of 
the  reactor core.  In this case  the safety performance is expres-
sed  as  a  probabilistic expectation.  Probabilistic Safety Assess-
ment  techniques  are  used  to  estimate  this  probability  and  to 
describe  the  accidents,  as  explained in the preceeding paragraph, 
although  the  accuracy  of  the  probability  estimates  needs  to  be 
improved  and  is the object of  ongoing research. 
2.2.  Levels  of  regulatory provisions 
Annex  II  contains  a  definition  of  terms  currently  used  in  natio-
nal  and  international  regulatory  provisions.  Three  different 
levels  of  hierarchy  are  illustrated  i.e.  general  principles, 
criteria and  guidelines,  construction codes  & standards. 
From  top  to  bottom  there  is  a  decreasing  legal  relevance  and 
reduced  lifetime.  Conversely  there  is  an  increasing  content  of 
technical  information.  Broadly  speaking  the  top  level  in  the 
hierarchy,  corresponding  to  the  "basic  safety  standards",  are 
embodied  in  national  legislation  and  do  not  lend  themselves  to 
modifications  other  than  by  a  relatively  long  legislative  pro-
cess. 
The  bottom  level,  i.e.  the  construction  codes  and  the  standards 
represent  "industrial  regulatory  provisions"  containing  updated 
information.  They  are  usually  developed  in  national  and  some-
times  international  standard  institutions  by  the  consensus 
method,  involving  all  relevant  organisations  and  companies. 
Because  of  this  they  lend  themselves  well  to  harmonisation.  The 
Construction  Codes  are  particularly  important  in  establishing  the 
safety  case  for  nuclear  reactors.  They  do  in  fact  prescribe  the 
design  methods  and  the  fabrication  and  inspection  procedures  for 
structures,  such  as  the  primary  circuits  and  they  must  assure 
with  a  high  degree  of  confidence  their  structural  integrity  in 
operating  conditions  and  in  a  prescribed  set  of  accidental 
conditions  or  of  events  of  external  origin.  It  is  useful  to 
recall  that  the  assurance  of  integrity  of  the  pr:f.mary  circuit 
plays  a  central role in the safety case for all reactor systems. 
2.3.  Harmonisation/Intercomparisons 
Even  before  the  Council  Resolution  of  22.7.75  came  into  existence 
the  Commission  had  performed  actions  of  harmonisation/intercompa-
risons,  in  recognition  of  the  benefits  accruing  both  to  the 
participants  to  such  actions  and  to  the  Community  itself.  These 
benefits can  be briefly summarised  as  follows: 
A  major  benefit  from  such  activities  from  a  safety  point  of  view 
derives  from  the  exchange  and  pooling  of  information  and  comments 
upon  the  approaches  evolved  by  different  organisations  and  coun-
tries  to  the  design  and  licensing  of  nuclear  installations.  The 
ensuing  process  of  analysis  and  the  diversity  of  scrutiny  of  the 
various  approaches  tends  to  consolidate  the  confidence  in  each 
others'  approach  and  to  ensure  that  potentially  severe  sequences - 4  -
of  accidents  have  not  been  overlooked.  Furthermore,  the  coun-
tries  with  the  smaller  nuclear  programme  can  benefit  from  the 
strength  of  knowledge  and  experience  of  the  others.  Overall  the 
effect  is  to  promote  convergence  to  an  equivalent  assurance  of 
safety throughout  the Community. 
A  major  potential  benefit  derives  from  the  removal  of  technical 
obstacles,  motivated  on  safety  grounds,  to  trade  in  components 
and  materials  needed  for  nuclear  installations.  This  can  only 
achieved  if Codes  and  Standards  for  component  design,  manufacture 
and  quality  control  as  well  as  materials  specifications  are 
either harmonised  or recognised  as equivalent. 
Eventually  a  reactor  component  designed  for  a  given  set  of  opera-
ting  and  accidental  conditions  accepted  by  a  utility  and  by  a 
licensing  authority  in  one  country  should  be  acceptable  by 
another  utility  and  licensing  authority  in  another  country 
without  substantial  modifications  other  than  those  dictated  by 
the site. 
The  reactor  industries  of  the  Community  have  an  excellent  record 
of  achievement  in  both  quantity  and  quality  of  their  products  and 
the  safety  record  of  European  reactors  is very  good  :  the  compet-
itive  position  of  these  industries  vis  a  vis  the  extra  Community 
industry  is  therefore  soundly  based.  The  Commission  has  there-
fore  stressed  to  the  Member  Countries,  that  their  competitivity 
would  be  strengthened  by  the  existence  of  coherent  regulatory 
provisions  enjoying  acceptance  at  Community  level  this  should 
motivate  them  toward  the harmonization goal. 
3.  ANALYSIS  OF  THE  STATUS  OF  IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  COUNCIL  RESOLU 
TION  OF  22.7.75 
The  Council  Resolution,  appended  as  Annex  I,  addresses  a  series 
of  exhortations  to  the  Commission  and  to  the  Member  States  upon 
the  objectives  and  the  lines  of  action  to  be  followed  concerning 
the  progressive  harmonisation  of  safety  requirements  and  criteria 
throughout  the  Community.  It  covers,  in  principle,  all  nuclear 
activities,  including those linked with the fuel  cycle. 
In  its  implementation,  the  Commission  has  chosen  to  focus  the 
work,  initially,  on  the  Light  Water  Reactor  (LWR)  which  repre-
sents  by  far  the  most  numerous  category  of  nuclear  installations 
in  the  Commission.  In  197  5,  Light  Water  Reactors  were  already 
commercially  established  in  the  Community  and  indeed  in  the 
world.  They  owed  much  to  the  U.S.  technology  which  was  trans-
planted  in  Europe  during  the  1960's.  For  this  reason  much  of  the 
regulatory  framework  had  a  common  U.S.  origin.  The  adaptation  to 
European  conditions  required  consideration  of  the  specificity  of 
European  countries  concerning  geological  conditions,  population 
density,  industrial  environment  and  practices,  and  legal  frame-
works.  The  Liquid  Metal  Fast  Breeder  Reactor  (LMFBR)  being 
developed  by  a  large  group  of  Member  Countries  as  a  future 
generation  of  reactors  has  also  been  a  main  focus  of  attention. 
Fast  Breeder  Reactors  development  has  been  essentially  based  upon 
indigenous  technology  and  has  benefited  from  increasing  collabo-
ration amongst  Member  States. - 5  -
Point  2  of  the  Council  Resolution  invites  the  Commission  and 
Member  States  to  list  and  compare  the  requirements  and  criteria 
applied  to  nuclear  power  stations,  to  draw  up  a  balance  of 
similarities  and  dissimularities  and  to  develop  recommendations. 
In  1975,  when  the  Council  Resolution  was  issued,  the  Light  Water 
Reactor  was  already  well  into  its  phase  of  expansion  within  the 
Community,  and  separate  independent  industrial  developments  had 
already  begun.  Conversely  the  Liquid  Metal  Fast  Breeder  Reactor 
development  was  still at  its  prototype  phase,  with  demonstration 
initiatives  being  planned  or  taken  on  a  collaborative  multilate-
ral  basis.  These  cir"cuinstances  explain. the  different  status  of 
implementation  of  the  197  5  Council  Resolution · and  call ·for  a 
separate  treatment  in this report. 
In  1979  the  Three  Mile  Island  incident  focused  the  attention  of 
the  nuclear  community  on  a  number  of  important  safety  issues  for 
Light  Water  Reactors,  such  as  containment,  personnel  qualifica-
tion,  quality  assurance  and· "small"  primary  circuit  breaks.  In 
the  ensuing  period  of  evaluation  and  assimilation  of  the  lessons 
learned  from  the  incident  it  appeared  that  the  Light  Water 
Reactor  lines  within  the  Community  had  developed  towards  a 
remarkably  uniform  product  if judged  from  the  point  of  view  of 
safety  and  reliability  performance,  in  spite  of  the  independent 
separate  industrial  developments  and  the  fragmentation  of  the 
market.  Such  a  healthy  state  of  affairs  can  be  attributed  partly 
to  the  technical  strength  of  the  utilities  within  the  Community 
and  partly  to  the  exchange  of  information  and  ideas  promoted  by 
the  Commission  under  the  1975  Council  Resolution,  all  leading  to 
substantial  paralel  thinking  in  spite  of  diversities  in  the 
details  of  the  applications.  However  the  Three  Mile  Island 
incident  made  it  necessary  to  adjust  safety  philosophies  and 
practices both  in US  and  in the  Community. 
In assessing  the  status of  implementation of  the Council Resolution 
of  22.7. 75  it  necessary  to  take  into  account  that  the  dynamics 
introduced  by  the intense development  of nuclear energy in the last 
decade  as well  as  by  the  Three  Mile  Island  incident,  have  rendered 
its  implementation  less  straightforward  than  originally  intended 
and  delays  have  occurred  in  consolidating  the  results  achieved  in 
the  field  of  Light  Water  Reactors  into  formal  expressions  of 
consensus. 
3.1.  Harmonization actions performed  on  Light  Water  Reactors  and  Fast 
Breeder Reactor 
3.1.1.  Light  Water  Reactors 
In  carrying  out  the  activities  related  to  the  point  2  of  the 
Resolution,  the  Commission  is  assisted  by  a  Working  Group  on 
"Safety  of  Light  Water  Reactors  :  Methodologies,  Criteria,  Codes 
and  Standards",  composed  by  representations  from  licensing 
authorities, utilities and  constructors. 
This  group  has  regularly discussed and  exchanged  information upon 
all matters related to  LWR  safety such as  : 
.  Regulatory  requirements  and  technological  problems  concerning 
the  different  phases  in  the  life of  a  plant  :  siting,  design, 
construction,  commissioning,  operation and  backfitting. 
•  Regulatory  requirements  and  technological  problems  which  are (*) 
(**) 
(***) 
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concerning  more  than· one  phase  in  the  life  of  the  plant  and 
relate e.g.  to  the  areas  of  :  safety evaluation,  quality assu-
rance,  ergonomies,  emergency planning. 
With  reference  to  Annex  II  the  level at  which  the  harmonisation 
activities  has  been  addressed  is  mostly  level  2,  i.e.  Require-
ments  (or Criteria)  and  Guidelines.  This  level is just below  the 
level  at  which  legal  instruments  are  used  in  the  national  con-
text.  Level  3  i.e.  design  and  construction  codes  and  standards 
has needed less attention because of  the  reasons  outlined above  : 
for  instance  the  ASME  (*)  Codes  are  commonly  used  in  European 
countries. 
Level  1  i.e.  Safety principles has  been the subject of a  Communi-
cation  to  the  Council  (**)  containing  a  set  of  basic  safety 
principles and  a  scheme  for subsequent  requirements  and  criter:f.a. 
These basic principles are  intended  to form  a  framework which  can 
be  used  as  reference  for  judgements  that  must  be  made  in  the 
safety evaluation  process  by  regulatory  bodies,  licencing  autho-
rities, utilities, equipment vendors,  architect engineers etc.  to 
adopt  a  consistent and  uniform approach. 
The  inventory  of  regulatory  provisions,  in  the  different  Member 
States,  is essentially  completed  even  though  it is  necessary  to 
update  information  periodically.  The  documents  issued  in  this 
connection are published regularly  (***). 
Concerning  the identification of similarities and  dissimilarities 
and  their  assessment,  different  degrees  of  progress  have  been 
achieved  in different subjects. 
Thus  the  subjects  which  have  so  far  been  treated  and  for  which 
reports  and  studies  have  been  completed  and  are available  to  the 
participants organisations or published are given  in Annex  III as 
well as  a  list of subjects which are currently been treated. 
The  process  of  formalizing  the  technical  consensus  already 
reached  is  being  initiated  with  the  forthcoming  issue  of  a 
special  Publication  on  an  important  set  of  subjects  related  to 
the  personnel  for  the  operation  of  nuclear  power  plants  i.e.  : 
qualification,  training,  licencing/authorization  and  retraining. 
This  publication  contains  information  on  practices  in  Community 
Countries  as  well  as  fundamental  and  generally  valid  concepts 
concerning shift personnel selection,  training and  licencing. 
American  Society of l-fechanical  Engineers 
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The  basic  data  necessary  as  an  input  for  providing  safe  designs 
against  earthquakes  is  being  also  the  subject  of  a  forthcoming 
publication  in  the  form  of  an  European  seismic  catalogue  and 
maps.  The  seismological data available  on  a  national basis  have 
been  collected,  the  discrepancies  analysed  and  solved  in  a  view 
to establish a  set of consistent data,  a  general European catalo-
gue  of  earthquakes  is  established  (51. 000  events)  in  a  homoge-
neous  format  on  an  informatic  support.  Based  on  this  catalogue, 
seismic  maps  covering  all  the  member  countries  and  the  neigh-
bouring  countries are being prepared.  This material will benefit 
not  only the nuclear  industry but is applicable for  the design of 
all seismic  structures. 
Finally it is  useful  to  remark  that  philosophies  and  practices, 
which  are important  to safety are not  necessarily codified within 
Member  States  even  when  a  consensus  exists.  The  philosophy  of 
containment  systems  is  a  case  in  point  which  is worth  illustra-
ting. 
Containment  system  designs  have  evolved  in  function  of  the 
requirement  that  they  should  provide  radiation  shielding  and 
retain  the  steam,  water  and  radioactivity discharged  in  a  design 
basis  accident.  The  design  basis  accident  (of  internal  origin) 
for  which  LWR  containments  are  conservatively  designed  is  the 
largest  double-ended  primary  pipe  rupture  which  would  cause 
maximum  energy,  pressure,  temperature  and  radioactive release. 
Another  requirement  has  been  the  protection  against  external 
phenomena  like  aircraft  crash  and  possible blast  waves  from  gas 
cloud  explosions. 
Lastly,  following  the  lessons  of  the  Three  Mile  Island  accident, 
the  containment  design  must  also  to  take  into  account  accidents 
more  severe  than design basis accident. 
The  different  initial  situations  and  timings  of  development  of 
nuclear  energy  in  the  different  Member  States  have  led  in  the 
past  to  a  variety of  containment  philosophies  and  designs  in the 
Community.  However,  today,  one  can  observe  that  the  containment 
philosophies for Light  Water Reactors have  converged,  for instan-
ce all new  reactors  incorporate a  double  containment  feature. 
3.1.2.  Liquid Metal Fast  Breeder Reactor  (LMFBR) 
The  Commission  has  performed  an  action  of  progressive  harmonis-
ation of  regulatory provisions  for Fast  Breeder Reactors  from  the' 
early 70's.  In addition to  the already mentioned  Council Resolu-
tion  of  22/7/75,  the  Council  Resolution  of  18/2/80  on  Fast 
Breeder Reactors  (*)  applies to this work. 
(*)  OJ  C51/5  of  29/2/80.  This  Resolution  affirms  the  necessity  to 
keep  open  an effective option of Fast Breeder Reactors within the 
Community,  invites  the  Member  States which  have  carried  out  Fast 
Reactor  development  to  ensure  continuity  of  effort  and  invites 
the  Community  to  lend  support  to  these  objectives.  It  also 
reaffirms  the  role of  the  Fast  Reactor  Coordinating  Committee  in 
the  work  of  gradual  harmonization  of  safety  codes  and  measures. - 8  -
The  fast  Breeder  Reactor  being  in  the  phase  of  development  and 
demonstration,  the  .  regulatory  provisions  are  in  the  formative 
stage and  considerable evolution has  to be expected.  In planning 
its  action  the  Commission  has  sharply  focused  its  attention  on 
those  aspects  which  are  specific  to  Fast  Breeder  Reactors,  i.e. 
those  related  to  the  Nuclear  Steam  Supply  System.  Aspects  like 
siting,  emergency  planning,  the  conventional  part  of  the  plant, 
etc.  have  not  been  treated,  as  they  are  common  or  similar  to 
those for  commercial  thermal reactors. 
The  level  at  which  the  actions  have  been  addressed  are,  with 
respect  to Annex  II  : 
Level  2,  i.e. Criteria and  Guidelines 
Level  3,  i.e.  Codes  and  Standards 
3.1.2.1.  LMFBR  Safety Criteria and Guidelines 
In carrying out  the activities directed at the harmonisation of 
LMFBR  safety criteria and  related  guidelines  the  Commission  is 
assisted  by  the  Fast  Reactor  Safety  Working  Group  (SWG)  which 
is a  subgroup  of the Fast  Reactor Coordinating Committee  (FRCC) 
(*). 
The  Safety  Working  Group  is  composed  of  representatives  of  all 
parties  involved  in fast  reactor development,  construction  and 
operation,  i.e.  representatives  from  governments,  utilities, 
industry,  research organisations  and  licensing authorities.  It 
has  regularly  discussed  and  exchanged  information  upon  all 
matters  related  to  Fast  Breeder  Reactor  safety,  such  as  the 
results  of  safety  research  programmes,  operational  experience 
of prototypes,  abnormal  occurrences,  etc. 
The  initial  step  in  the  harmonisation  of  safety  criteria  and 
guidelines  was  the  setting up  of  a  reference list of  accidents 
considered  as  the  design  basis  for  fast  reactors.  These  are 
grouped under five  headings  as  follows  (a more  detailed list is 
given in Annex  IV) 
Primary Reactivity 
General Cooling 
Subassembly cooling 
External  to  the  core 
Initiating events external to  the station 
Between  1970  and  1975  the safety measures  designed  to  cope with 
these  accidents  were  identified  for  each  LMFBR  project  in 
construction or under  design  in the  European  Community  (Super-
phenix  1,  CFR  1,  SNR  300,  PEC),  and  a  systematic  comparison was 
made. 
(*)  Committee  created by  the Council in April  1970 with the mandate 
"to work  out  and  implement  plans  for  coordination  and  coopera-
tion  on  the  broadest  possible  scale  between  the  various  pro-
grammes  by  means  of  the  most  suitable  procedures  and  to  make 
any helpful suggestion in this connection". :~ 
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For each accident  and  project 
the possible initiators 
the design provisions 
the protective actions 
any  immediate  consequences 
and possible evolution 
were  considered  and  compared  and  appropriate  comments  were 
made. 
The  comments  refer  to  the  general  safety  philosophy,  the  state 
of  the reactor at  termination of  the accident,  the worst situa-
tion  analysed  etc...  In  addition,  a  qualitative  probability 
rating for the  occurrence of  an accident was  made. 
Differences  in the safety approach  and  design measure  envisaged 
in  the  projects  were  discussed  in  great  detail  in  order  to 
permit  the  arguments  on which  the  designer had  based his choice 
to  be  made  mutually  transparent.  Generally  common  features 
could  be  identified which  could serve as  a  basis for the formu-
lation of criteria and  guidelines for the future. 
Building  up  upon  the  work  described  above,  the  formulation  of 
common  safety criteria and  guidelines  for  future  large  commer-
cial fast  reactors began  in 1975. 
In  the  formulation of  common  safety criteria and  guidelines the 
following  approach has  been adopted: 
- Criteria  and  Guidelines  have  been  associated  in  the  same 
document;  the  examples  given  in  the  guidelines  for  possible 
design  measure  are  not  exhaustive  but  have  been  selected  in 
such  a  way  as  to  give assurance  that  a  complete  coverage  can 
be  reached,  in due  time. 
The  criteria and  guidelines  are  intended  to be  the basis  upon 
which  the national regulations will  be  formalised. 
- They are  based  on present  knowledge  and  proven  technology  and 
are  consistent  with  the  design  philosophy  of  the  already 
built prototypes  (Phenix,  the Prototype Fast  Reactor,  SNR  300 
and  Superphenix).  Expected  results  forthcoming  from  current 
R&D  programmes will be  taken into account  at  a  later stage. 
- The  safety  criteria  and  guidelines  refer  essentially  to 
design  aspects  putting  main  emphasis  on  the  prevention  of 
accidents,  their  early  detection  and  finally  the  mitigation 
of possible  consequences. 
Present  Status 
A first  formulation  of  accident oriented  common  safety criteria 
and  guidelines  for  all  the  accidents  in  the  reference  list is 
now  concluded  and  criteria and  guidelines  are  in  a  draft  form. 
Editing is currently underway  in order  to ensure consistency in 
the wording  used  t~~oughout. 
The  fact  that  provisional  common  criteria and  guidelines  exist 
is  in itself a  positi.ve  element.  The  painstaking working  over 
such  a  long  period  of  time  has  certainly ensured  a  high  degree - 10  -
of mutual understanding of the safety case for fast  reactors  in 
the Member  Countries pursuing this line of reactor development. 
The  mass  of  documentation  and  the  records  which  have  been kept 
of  the discussion is large. 
Also  for  the  L.M.F.B.R.  the  double  approach  based  upon  design 
basis accidents  and  probabilistic analysis,is  used  just  as  for 
Light Water  Reactors. 
3.1.2.2.  LMFBR  Codes  and  Standards 
For  this  activity  the  Commission  is  assisted  by  the  Fast 
Reactor  Working  Group  on  Codes  and  Standard  (WGCS),  a  Sub-Group 
of the Fast Reactor Coordinating Committee. 
This  activity was  initiated  in  1974  but  it is  only  since  1980 
that  substantial  effort  has  become  available.  The  design  and 
manufacture  procedures for  LMFBR  components  having  an  important 
safety  function  are  different  from  those  for  the  Light  Water 
Reactor  and  the  pertinent national  codes  and  standards  need  to 
be  harmonised;  in  some  cases  they  are  being  developed  in 
common.  The  Commission,  with  the  assistance  of  the  above 
Working  Group,  has  gathered  together  information  from  the 
Member  States  and  has  compared  and  analysed  the  different 
national  documents  relating  to  the  design,  the  manufacture  and 
materials  properties of  interest  for  LMFBR  components  having  a 
safety  function.  These  comparative  studies  have  helped  to 
identify discrepancies between the different national  codes  and 
standards  as  well  as  shortcomings  of  the  design  procedures 
based  on  the  ASME  Codes  and  shortage  and/or  uncertainties  of 
materials data,  particularly in the creep  range.  This has made 
it possible  to  envisage actions  at national  level  to ·eliminate 
gradually or to  reduce  the main divergences  observed as well  as 
to  improve  the analytical tools  and  the materials data base. 
Annex  V  contains  a  list of  completed  studies,  with  indication 
of publication status. 
The  impact  of  these  studies  on  national codes  and  standards  is 
considerable,  particularly  in  those  areas,  such  as  the  design 
rules  for  components  subject  to  thermal  loads,  where  design 
codes were unsatisfactory. 
3.2.  Research Coordination  (point  3  of  the Council Resolution) 
Coordination of safety research effort has  so far been supported  by 
the following means: 
- The  substantial  R6<D  Community  effort  both  as  direct  and  shared 
cost  action,  has  been  a  major  tool  to  encourage  coordination  of 
Member  States  and  Community  research,  particularly  on  those 
subjects which are included  in the scope  of Community  programmes. 
The  recently  instituted Management  and  Coordination  Committee  No 
5  (Reactors  and  Safeguards)  (*)  covers  the  field  of  the  nuclear 
safety programme. 
(*)  Before  1985  a  similar role was  performed  by  the  Advisory  Committee 
on Programme  Management  "Reactor Safety" + Working  Group  n°  2. I 
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- The  work  of  harmonisation  of  Safety  Criteria  Guidelines.  Codes 
and  Standards  provides  the  participants  with  an  opportunity  to 
exchange  information  and  views  on  a  number  of  safety issues  that 
though  not  directly  concerned  with  the  day  to  day  management  of 
safety  research.  can  lead  to  anticipation of  research  trends  and 
needs  from  an overall viewpoint. 
3.3.  Notification  of  draft legislation  (point  6  of  the  Council  Resolu-
tion) 
Very  few  of  these  have  been notified.  This  is not  due  to  failure 
by  the  Member  States  to notify but  rather  by  a  low  rate of  produc-
tion by  the Member  States.  Legislation is notoriously difficult to 
modify  and  tends  to  be  used  only  for  the  higher  level  of  general 
safety principles  (such as e.g.  the basic safety standards). 
Conversely non-legal  instruments  such as Criteria Guidelines,  Codes 
and  Standards  have  been  freely  communicated  and  assessed  and  have 
been  the  object  of  the  harmonisation  and  intercomparison  as  per 
point  3.1. 
3.4.  Seeking  common  positions  on  safety harmonisation  and  research 
coordination in international fora  (point  7  of  the  Council 
Resolution) 
The  Commission  has  vigorously  pursued  the  implementation  of  this 
point.  On  the  side  of  safety  harmonisation  one  can  mention  the 
exercise  of  compilation  of  the  Nuclear  Safety  Standards  (NUSS) 
within  the  frame  of  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  of 
Vienna.  On  the  side  of  research  coordination  one  can  mention  the 
PISC  (*)  programme.  initially  born  under  the  auspices  of  the 
Nuclear  Energy Agency  (NEA)  of the  OECD.  The  Joint  Research  Center 
(JRC)  is  now  the  operating  agent  and  implements  a  supporting  R&D 
programme.  Similarly  the  JRC  is  the  operating  agent  for  the 
Incident Reporting  System  (IRS)  of  the  NEA. 
4.  ACHIEVEMENTS  AND  PROBLEMS 
4. 1.  After  ten  years  of  implementation  of  the  Council  Resolution  of 
22. 7. 7  5 •  one  can  recount  the  following  achievements  and  the  pro-
blems  encountered. 
- The  exchange  of  information  and  the  comparison  of  methodologies 
and  practices  have  been  fruitful  to  all  participants  and  have 
permitted a  better understanding of  approaches.  This has  lead  to 
a  progressive  harmonisation  of  safety  philosophy  which  is  real, 
though  difficult  to  quantify  into  criteria.  codes  and  standards 
at  least  for  Light  Water  Reactors.  In  fact  it  has  so  far  not 
been possible to  complete  the  second  stage  (the identification of 
similarities and dissimilarities)  because  of  the relatively rapid 
developments  which  have  taken place in the last ten years both in 
the  field  of  nuclear  power  installation  and  in  the  field  of 
regulatory  practices.  However  the  numerous  publications  and 
reports  which  have  been  issued  or  are  being  prepared  cons"titute 
the  background  material  from  which  the  detail  status  of  conver-
gence  of  regulatory provisions  can  be  synthetized. 
(*)  Programme  for  Inspection of Steel Components - 12  -
- The  progress  made  in  the  field  of  Liquid  Metal  Fast  Breeder 
Reactors  appears  to  have  been  more  easy  and  systematic  than  in 
Light  Water  Reactors.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
harmonization  work  was  started  well  in  advance  of  commercial 
applications,  and  partly  to  the  fact  that  fast  reactor  develop-
ment  and  demonstration  has  benefited  from  the  collaboration  of 
Member  States at both research and industrial level.  However  the 
present  stagnation  of  initiatives  towards  a  further  stage  of 
dempnstration/commercialization of fast breeder reactors accounts 
for  a  certain lack of  focus  in the further development  of  regula-
tory provisions. 
- The  complexity of  the subjects  to  be  treated and  the large number 
of  participants  from  organisations  from  different  Member  States 
and  having  different  roles  in  the  national  policies  of 
implementation  of  nuclear  programmes  (utilities,  constructors, 
licensing authorities,  research organisations) has  sometimes made 
it  difficult  to  find  consensus.  Furthermore,  most  of  these 
organisations  are  reluctant  to  envisage  a  central  role  of  the 
Community  on regulatory matters,  beyond  that enshrined in Chapter 
III of the Euratom Treaty. 
- The  rate of progress  in  the work  has  been  governed  partly by  the 
rate  at  which  participating  organisations  have  been  able  to 
supply  input  documents,  responses  to  questionnaires  and  evalu-
ation effort and  partly by the Commission's  own  efforts.  Decrea-
sing budget allocations in the last few  years have not helped. 
5.  FUTURE  ACTION 
The  objectives  of  the  Council  Resolution  of  22  July  1975  concerning 
the  technological  problems  of  nuclear  safety  (*)  are still valid  and 
provide  guidance  for  Community  action.  However,  it  must  also  be 
stressed  that  the  Community  has  no  direct  role  in  the  licencing 
procedure  and  in the national regulatory process. 
There  clearly  remains  a  common  interest  to  work  together  to  ensure 
that  nuclear  installations  in  the  Community  are  safe  in  all 
circumstances  and  to  provide  public  opinion and  decision makers  with 
clear explanations of the means  used  to ensure this  s~fety. 
The  Chernobyl  accident  has  raised  many  fears  and  added  a  new 
challenge to nuclear energy. 
To  deal  with  this  challenge,  the  Commission  intends  to  pursue  the 
following strategy 
a)  to bring quickly .to fruition the work already performed; 
b)  to initiate new  actions.which,  though  coherent with  the objectives 
of the Council Resolution of  22.7.75,  go  beyond  the continuation 
(*)  i.e  •. "to provide an equivalent  and  satisfactory degree of 
protection  of  the  population  and  of  the  environment  against  the 
risks  of  radiation  resulting  from  nuclear  activities  and  at  the 
same  time  to assist  the  development  of  trade  on  the  understanding 
that  such  harmonization  should  not  involve  any  lowering  of  the 
safety level already attained". 
I  ,. 
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of  the  harmonisation  process  pursued  up  to 
cooperation  and  support  of  the  Member  States 
fulfil these actions. 
now.  The  full 
is  necessary  to 
The  main  thrust of this strategy rests upon  four  points 
(i)  Harmonisation, 
(ii)  Safety reviews, 
(iii) Continuity of effort, 
(iv)  International cooperation. 
The  Commission  intends  to  implement  this  strategy  and  particularly 
the  new  actions  in  close  consultation  and  with  the  support  of  the 
Scientific and  Technical  Committee. 
5.1.  Harmonisation 
Harmonisation  of  criteria,  guidelines,  codes  and  standards  is 
necessary  to  ensure  an  equivalent  and  satisfactory  degree  of 
protection  of  the  population  and  the  personnel  against  the  risks 
posed  by  the  exploitation  of  nuclear  installation  and,  in  parti-
cular, nuclear reactors. 
5.1.1.  The  approach  to harmonization as  indicated at point  2  of  the  1975 
Council  Resolution  should  proceed  quickly  towards  an  interim 
conclusion,  on  the basis of  the  information already available for 
Light  Water Reactors. 
Concerning  Light  Water Reactors  the Commission  intends  to publish 
periodically descriptions of criteria and  guidelines pertinent to 
the  most  important  safety  related  issues  in  Member  States, 
assorted  with  statements  of  convergence/divergence.  A  first 
important  set of criteria and  guidelines will be  published within 
1987. 
5.1.2.  The  further  development  of  fast  breeder  reactor  criteria, 
guidelines,  codes  and  standards  will  be  pursued.  Given  the 
pattern  of  cooperative  development  in  the  Community,  the  work 
must  proceed  in  step  with  the  progress  toward  the  demonstra-
tion/commercialization  within  the  framework  of  collaboration 
amongst  Member  States  (Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Italy,  United 
Kingdom).  The  Council  Resolution  on  Fast  Breeder  Reactors  of 
18/02/1980  provides  the  guidance  by  which  the  Community  can. 
support  the  achievement  of  the  objective  of  continuity  in  the 
development/demonstration  of  a  system  which  is  safe  and  licen-
seable  in  the  Community. 
In  relation  to  fast  breeder  reactors,  the  Commission  intends  to 
continue  to  make  its contribution  toward  achievement  of  the  goal 
of  a  full  set  of  criteria,  guidelines,  codes  and  standards. 
These  should  be  applicable to  the practical design of  a  family  of 
reactors  throughout  the  Community.  They  should  be 
straightforward  by·products  of  the  construction  and  exploitation 
cooperation which is currently being  pursued  by  a  group of Member 
States. - 14  -
5.2.  Safety Reviews 
The  population  of  reactors  in  the  Community  comprises  Light  Water 
Reactors  of  different  designs,  sizes,  ages  as  well  as  Gas  Cooled 
Graphite  Moderated  Reactors.  A  number  of  Light  Water  Reactors 
are  now  approaching  the  age  of  20  years,  and  a  considerable 
proportion  of  Gas  Cooled  Graphite  Moderated  Reactors  are  even 
older.  Of  course  Member  States  conduct  safety  reviews  on  indivi-
dual  reactors  "or  classes  thereof,  using  the  most  up  to  date 
methodologies,  including  Probabilistic  Safety  Assessment  (PSA)  in 
order  to  check  their  safety  performance,  to  identify  the  possible 
needs  for  backfitting  and  to  help  taking  decisions  about  withdra-
wal  from  service.  These  safety  reviews  permit,  in  the  light  of 
experimental  data  on  incidents  collected  from  similar  reactors, 
to  identify  potentially  dangerous  sequences  of  events  so  far 
overlooked,  the  weak  points  of  the  design  and  the  consequences  of 
aging  of  components.  Detail  knowledge  of  the  installations  is 
obviously  important  and  therefore  such  exercises  can  only  be 
conducted with  the participation of  experts  having  such  a  detailed 
knowledge,  i.e.  from  the  utilities  and  constructors.  Indeed  the 
full  responsibility  of  conducting  these  reviews  rests  with  the 
Member  States.  However  there  would  be  added  value  in  exchanging 
information  upon  the  plans,  the  scope,  the  input  data,  the 
execution  and  the  results  of  such  reviews  within  a  Community 
framework  and  with  the  participation of  the  Commission's  Services 
within  the  limits  of  possibility.  This  approach  would  usefully 
complement  the  "harmonization"  approach  and  would  respond  more 
directly  to  the  concern  of  the  public  over  the  safety  of  nuclear 
reactors. 
The  Commission  intends  to promote  cooperation at Community  level in 
the  field  of  reactor  safety  reviews  so  that  the methodologies,  the 
plans,  the  scope,  the  input  data  and  the  results  concerning  these 
reviews  can  become  mutually  transparent.  This  will  improve  the 
effectiveness of  the safety reviews. 
5.3.  Continuity of effort 
The  role  of  nuclear  energy  in  the  energy  balance  of  the  Community 
is  very  important.  Although  the  performance  of  Community  nuclear 
power  plants  from  the  safety  point  of  view  has  been  consistently 
satisfactory,  continuing effort to support  the safe exploitation of 
nuclear installations must  be assured. 
The  factors  which  have  contributed  to  such  a  healthy  state  of 
affairs  must  be  preserved  and  stenghtened.  Stringent  criteria, 
codes  and  standards  are  certainly  one  factor;  however  the  human 
factor  both  in  the  phase  of  design  and  construction  and  in  the 
phase  of  operation  of  reactors  has  plaid  a  major  role.  Expert 
teams  of  scientists  and  engineers  have  been  created  and  maintained 
by  the utilities,  the  reactor  constructors,  the  licencing  authori-
ties  and  the  research  organization  to  support  the  steadily  expan-
ding  nuclear  programmes  over  the  last  25  years.  These  human 
resources,  together with the laboratories  and  facilities for safety 
research  developed  over  the  years  are  the  main  assets  upon  which - 15  -
the  Member  States  can  rely  in  the  future  for  a  continuing  safe 
performance  of  nuclear  installations.  Continuity of  effort  and  of 
its quality is necessary. 
The  excellence  of  the  teams  of  experts  and  engineers  created  and 
maintained  up  to  now  must  be efficiently safeguarded.  Although  the 
Member  States  of  the  Community  possess  the  capability  to  maintain 
the  necessary  high  standards  and  the  human  resources,  economic 
pressures  and  some  decline  in  the  tempo  of  reactor  development 
could  threaten  the  continuing viability of  some  national  capabili-
ties.  Continuing  cooperation is essential for an effective manage-
ment  of  these  resources.  Equally  the  future  evolution  of  research 
laboratories  and  major  safety  facilities  must  be  collectively 
reviewed  so  that  decisions  affecting  the  long  term  (e.g.  construc-
tion,  exploitation,  abandonment  of  facilities)  can  be  taken  in  a 
cooperative  framework. 
The  Commission  intends  to  review  the  situation  concerning  human 
resources  and  major  facilities  dedicated  to  safety  of  nuclear 
installations at periodic intervals. 
5.4.  International cooperation 
The  accident  at  Chernobyl  has  given  fresh  emphasis  to  the issue of 
overall  safety  of  reactors  worldwide  and  has  provided  a  clear 
demonstration  of  the  need  for  cooperation  on  nuclear  safety  well 
beyond  the national or even regional boundaries. 
At  world  level  initiatives  have  been  proposed  within  the  frame  of 
the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  to  review  and  improve  the 
Nuclear  Safety  Standards  (NUSS)  as  well  as  to  take  other  actions 
to  increase international cooperation on nuclear safety. 
The  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  has  a  key  role  to  play  in 
bringing  about  rigorous  standards  of  safety  assurance  in  the 
different  regions  of  the  world  and  merits  the  full  support  of  the 
Community  and  its  Member  States  in  this  complex  and  long  term 
task. 
The  Member  States  and  the  Community  should  actively  support  the 
initiatives  taken  within  the  frame  of  the  International  Atomic 
Energy  Agency. 
*  *  * 
The  Council is invited  to  lend support  to  these actions. l 
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(')  OJ  No C  l~S. 9. 6.  1975, p.  ~~-
.:ousrructors  :tnJ  <:nergy  producers  will  be  :~.ble  to 
hcncfit  from  :1  lt:H1nouiz.:J  :1ppro:~ch 10 the problem 
:tr Conumutity lcn:l; 
\\'hcrc:ts  u_ude:•r  s:Jfety  problems extend beyond dtc 
fromicrs  not  onlr  of  Member  St:nes  but  of  the 
C(lmmunity  :JS  :1  wlwlc, and  it is iocurnbcm on the 
Commission to :Jet  :ts  :1  C:Jt:Jiyst  for  initi:~ti,·cs to be 
uken uu :t hro:~Jcr ill(em:uion:tl pbne, 
IIF.RFIIY  t\DOl'TS ·n-IlS  RESOLUTION: 
Till'.  COUNCIL 
I.  r,·yu..:q~ tho.:  ,\Jcmber Sr:ttcs as well  :J.S  the liccusinr. 
:uuhorit_ics  '"''!  the  s:~fct y  :tnd  inspection 
:wrlwriti,·s  on  rl11:  one  h:tnd,  :tn,i  the  oper:~tors 
:t11J  constructors  <Ht  doc  orlter,  :~nd  fiu:~llr  the 
:~;:cnc•cs  rcsr•ousibk  for  applied  rcsejrch 
pr<ohr.1n11ucs  t<o  C<>llttnuc  to colbboratc dfcctivclr 
:H Couununiry k,·cl; 
'  :~:-;rccs  l<l  tltc  COIIr~c of :JCIIOn  m  Sl:l£.CS  inJioted 
l•duw  lw  the  Commis~ion  in  respect  of  the 
prO!;ressi'-c  lnnuonivriou of s:tfcty  Jequircmcll(s 
:tnJ critni:t iu orJcr to pro,·idc :111  equiv:tlcm :md 
,_u isfa..:wry  Jq~rce of protection of the population 
.m,l  of  the  nl\'ironiiKilt  :IJ;.lillst  the  risks  of 
r.di:uio11  n·su!tin&  fwm  uuck·:~r :t<.:ti,·irics  au,l  :H 
the  S:tiiK  ti111e  to  :tssist  the  Jevdopmcnt of trJde 
""  doc  ""dnsunJinj::  dt:tt  such  h:~rmnni7.:tliou 
~hnul,l not inn•h·c  ~"!" lowetin~,; of tbe s:~fcty lc,·cl 
.tlrudr  :lll:~iucJ;  ul.:u•~; in10  :~ccount the Sl:tlc  of 
in,lustri:tl devclnpmcnt in the rcspecti,·e bmilics of 
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hi~lt-p<•W<"f 11\ldt·"r  rct.:tuc<,  cl..-x:  ~Uf:o. invHin· 
li,;t in~  ;tn,l  ._.,,..,p:trin;.:  tl•c  r._-,luin:mcnts  ;llt<l 
<rit,·ri:t  ::tpj'linl :tot<l  ,lr:<win!: up :t  lubu<·<·-~lo,"l't .,( 
si~t~if.tritics  :m<l  .lis~imiLtritic.;;  formubtin~:  ::tS 
~r>Ull  :IS  J't"~j(,lc  f<."CIIIIIIII<"U<f:lliuns  pur!ltt;tll(  (U 
II•.:  ~.-..:uuJ  intklll  of :tnid.:  1.!4  of th.:  Eur::ttom 
Tr.:.lty,  :wJ  su~•S<:<JIICIUiy  suluniuin~  111  tit.: 
Cuuw.:il  tl.c  mosc  !lutl.ol>lc  ,lr::tft  Conununity 
pro\·isions; 
J.  :t;.:rc.:c>  tu  strcll~thc.:u  Ccontmunity  cff11rl!l  1<1 
cot•rJin:uc :tppli<..J  f<.'SC:trdt  pntgr:ttnnt<."S  iu  <>r<lt·r 
t"  m::tkc  the  bcsc  possil>lc· ~~~ of  the  n:sour.:cs 
:•~·:1ibhlc  in  d1c  C<>mmuuity  :mJ  the  f..kt11hcr 
St:u..:s  hotlt  tcdmie:~lly  :tn<l  fin:mei:tllr  wllil~c 
;1\'oiJinr;  :1!1  f.ar  :IS  J\(os_<;jJ.Jc  Utltll"CCSS:Ifr 
dupli.::ttion;  tht-sc  dfuns  slull  IX'  :tim..:d  :tt 
impnl~  inl~  s~·st<.·m:vic  t.•xdt:utgcs • uf  infunu:ttion. 
J'ftllll<ltin;~  C<IIICCrt<.:J  :t<.'fi<>U  :llltf  <."UOJ~f::tti<>U 
ht.·twccll  spcci:tli:r.c.l  hoJics  :mJ  inscitutcs  ''"'I 
~cimubtin!; where :tppropri:uc the ._k,·dupmcut of 
C<.~tnmunitr pro~,:r:tmtncs; 
4_  :ll'[lfOH'S ul thc  mcthO<Is  used  :~nJ :t.lvucueJ  by 
the  Commission,  11:1111d)',  mcctinJ.:_s  uf  wurkin~ 
p:trtto.:S  of  spe..:i:tli:r.eJ  C\(~ns,  cxd•::tn~es  ,,f 
inf<JrmJtion on  ~pe..:ifie  opcr:uivn:~l pruhh:ms :llld 
:m:tlyt i..::tl  ~tudi.:s  :111J  symhcsc.--s  wich  whidt ch,·,.: 
..:xpcn~ .ore  ::~sso.:i:uc,l; 
.\.  0111\CS  tlt:l!  Chc  U1ClSUI"CS  <.k-s.-riJ.,:J  :tl>U<'C  111.1\" 
re<Juirc :tpprupri:uions in ortkr ((> fin:mC<."  :llt:tly~c~ 
:tn.l  spulu.:scs  :md  the  :tppwpri:~ce  'fc<.hniol 
s.:.:rct::t ri::tt; 
•  (,_  r<:q!tCSIS  the  Mcmhcr  ·St:ttt-s  w  notify  the 
C<unmis.,ion  uf  :1ny  dr:~ft  bws,  rq~ubtious  or 
JHu\·isiuns  (J(  simibr s<.:op<.·  eonccruinh the  s:J.ktj· 
of  nude:tr  inst:tlbtions  in  ocJcr  to  cnJl>k  the 
:~ppn•pri:ne  <.:<lllsulc::ttions  to  Lc  hdJ  :11 
C<orntnunicr  level  ::tt  the  initi:ttivc  of  tlo.: 
Cunnnissiun; 
7.  r  ... :qucsc5  the  1\t..:rnbcr  St:ucs  to  St.'Ck  comllHllt 
J><•sitiuus  on  any  probk,us  eon.:crnmh  the 
lunnouiz:uiun  of  rC<Juirnncllls  :md  aitcri:t  :md 
lite  .:uurdin:~tion uf  resc:uch  inw  uu..:k:u  $:Jfn  ~­
h,·in!;;  <.k:th  with by  imernation::~l oq;.•ui7_·llion>; 
:\.  r<.:<Jucsts  the Conunission to s•1l•mic  :tnnu:tl reports 
ou the pro!:rcss nuJc :~nJ the Member St:ttcs :111d 
the  Conuni~sion to .:ominue  :~nJ strengtiKn their 
dfuns w  ensure th:Jt  the public  is  given  tk· hct 
po5siblc  j,£urnution  :thouc  hoth  n:Hion:~l  _,,J 
Cuumounity :Ktiun in the fidJ of nuck:u s:~kt:'-1. 
ANNEX  II 
Definition for a  number  of  terms  used  in safety 
rule of nuclear plants. 
- Safety principles. 
Based  on the requirements of radiological protection,  they allow 
to reach the objectives deriving  from it.  They  apply  to all 
phases of  plant life (s:fting,  design,  operation and  even 
decommissioning).  Sometimes  the  term of  general criteria is used 
in the same  sense. 
2.  - Safety requirements  and  safety guides 
Apply  to one  of  the phases of plant life or to certain areas like 
quality assurance. 
(Sometimes  the  term specific criteria is used  in the same  sense 
-as safety requirements).  · 
Safety  requirements are specific applications of safety 
principles.  Safety guides  recommend  different ways  of satisfying 
safety requirements. 
3.  - Codes  and  standards for construction. 
Codes  are a  collection of rules for design,  manufacture  and 
inspection of  systems  and  components  assuring the  respect of 
safety requirements. 
A standard is a  technical description or definition representing 
consensus  between interested parties and  issued by  a  recognized 
organization. 
The  above-defined principles and  rules may  have  a  legal status of 
different kind  running  from obligations  (law,  rule)  to plain 
recommendations  for use. 
N.B.  Safety Code  :  Collection of safety principles defining minimum 
requirements for structures,  systems.and components  (e.g.· .codes 
NUSS,.  series 50 of  IAEA)  refering to level 2  above. 
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ANNEX  III 
SUBJECTS  DISCUSSED  WITHIN  THE  WORKING  GROUP 
"LICHT  WATER  REACTORS  SAF1<:1'Y
11 
CONCERNlNG  MEMBER  STATES'  PRACTICES 
- Subjects already fully discussed  and  suscept:fble  to synthesis  : 
Siting 
Design 
Connnisston:lng 
and  Operation 
Safety 
Evaluation 
Quality 
Assurance 
Emergency 
Planning 
- Criteria for  site  scr~ening and  site selection 
Cdteria  for  taking  into  account  external  events 
(man  made  and  natural)  like  aircr.Aft  crash,  gas 
cloud  explosion,  floods  and  seism:l.c  effects. 
- Internal  and  external  accidents  sequences  which 
constitute the  design  basis of  the  plant 
- Reactor  coolant  system overall design provisions 
- Reactor protection system 
- P.lectric  power  supply 
- Fire  protection 
- Operator  training  and  qualification 
- Containment  integrity and  leak testing procedures 
- Deterministic methodology 
- Basic principles  relevant  to quality assurance 
- Onsite  and  offsite planning and  preparedness 
- Work  is in  progress  in  the  following  subjects pertaining  to  design  and 
opernt1on. 
Design 
Operation 
Safety 
Evaluation 
Comparison  of  rules  and  application  practices  of 
determinisit:lc  design  criteria  for  systems  important 
to safety.· 
Class:l.ficat:lon  of electric equipment. 
Environmental  qualification  of  safety  related  equip-
ment 
Dynamic  analysis  of  structures  and  systems  under 
seismic  loading and  aircraft crash 
Control  :room  layout  and  instrumentation 
Qualification and  training of maintenance  personnel 
Probabilistic safety  assessment  methodology 1o 
LIST  OF  REPORTS  ON  THE  SUBJECTS  OF  ANNEX  III 
/1/  SJ.tlng  prHct:lce~:~  and  criterf.n  in  EC  countries  and  usaoci.nted 
cons:fderation1-1. 
Revfsion  I,  Murch  1983. 
noc.  wcl-82/PJ. 
/2/  Cl~C study report. 
Methodology  for  coping  with  accidents  of  external  and  internal 
origin in  PWR  power  stations.  A comparison of  the  rules and  codes 
of  practice  1n  use  in  Belgium,  France,  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Gerrunny,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the United States od  America. 
August.  1984. 
/3/  CEC  study  report 
Comparaison  des  protiques  et  criteres  de  site  relatifs  a  la 
dt"mographic  et  il  l'hydrologie,  d'application aux  Etata-Unis,  dans 
le pays  du  Mnrche  Commun  et en  Suede. 
Octobre  1980. 
/4/  Protection of  nuclear power  plants agninst  floods. 
Revision  3,·Dccember  1984. 
noc.  WGl-77/J>20/Rev.3 
/5/  Protection of  mu:lcnr  power  plants against  seismic effects. 
Reference  ground  motion  :  pructlce  followed  in European  countr1.ea 
IWH  8371 
F.uropean  Avplied  Resenrch  Reportt~,  Volume  4,  N°6,  1983. 
/6/  CEC  study 
guropean  seismic  catalogue and  seismic maps. 
(Preparation of  a  special  publication). 
/7/  Protection of  NPPs  against  nircraft crash. 
Statua report  1980. 
/8/  Protection of nuclear  power  plnnts againat external  explosions. 
DOC.  WG1-7R/P2.  Revison  I, July  1979. 
/9/  CEC  study  report. 
Critical  review of models  of  dtnperHion  of explosive gaa  clouds. 
December  1979. 
I I 0/  ~:J~C  sponRored  theoret1.cal  s.tudtes  of  gas  cloud  explosion  pressure 
loadings. 
EUR  6119 
/I l/ CEC  study  report 
Caracteristiques  du  champ  de  pression  engendrl!  par  une  flamme 
accHeree en espace libre. 
EUR  8010.  1983. 
/12/  CEC  study report. 
Inventory nnd  comparison of methods  and  procedures  to investigate 
mechanical problems  caused  by  accidents of external origin.  1985. c) 
Zt 
/13/  CEC  study report. 
Comparison of design specifications for loss-of-coolant  accidents 
in  light  water  reactors  applicable  in  EC  member  states  and  USA. 
September  1982. 
/14/  CEC  study report 
Comparison  of  design  specifications  for  fuel  handling  accidents 
in  light  water  reactors  applicable  in  EC  member  states  and  the 
USA.  1978. 
/15/  CEC  study report 
Protection  of  BWR  nuclear  power  plants  against  steamline  break 
outside  containment.  1979. 
/16/  CEC  study report 
Comparison  of  the  design  specifications  for  protection  of  PWR 
nuclear  power  plants  against  main  steamline  break  outside 
contaiment.  November  1980. 
/17/  CEC  study report 
Comparison  of design specifications for protection of  PWR  nuclear 
power  plants  against  main  steamline  break  inside  containment. 
September  1981. 
/18/  ATWS  status report 
Part  I  :  Scram  unavailability  (1979) 
Part  II  :  Type  and  frequency  of anticipated transients  (1980) 
Part  III:  Consequences  (1981) 
/19/  CEC  study  report. 
Compilation  of  basic  fire  proteciton  principles  and  criteria 
related  to  design,  engineering,  construction  and  operation  for 
light water reactor nuclear  power  plants constructed and  operated 
in European  Community  countries.  1983. 
/20/  CEC  study report 
Inventory  of  national  specifications,  regulations  and  guidelines 
and  description of  methods  and  procedures  applied  in leak testing 
of  LWR  containment  systems.  1976. 
/21/  CEC  study report 
Containment  integrity  and  leak  testing  procedures  applied  and 
experiences gained  in European countries.  1985. 
/22/  CEC  study report 
Comparison  of  codes  and  standards  applied  in  European  countries 
and  the  USA  in the  design of primary  system components. 
November  1986. 
/23/  CEC  study report. 
LOCA  design specifications. 
November  1980. 
/24/  CEC  study report. 
Collection  and  comparison  of  the  existing  guidelines  and  provi-
sions  on  design,  manufacture,  testing  and  inspection  of  steel 
reactor pressure vessels. 
1978. /25/  CEC  study report. 
Inventory  and  comparison  of  analytical  methods  and  experimental 
procedures  existing  to  investigate  the  dynamic  loadi~gs  on 
primary  pipework  in nuclear  power  plants  caused  by  accidents  of 
external origin,  in particular by  seismic  response. 
1984. 
/26/ Protection  of  primary  system  and  its  components  against 
overpressure. 
Status report.  Revision 3,  December  1984. 
/27/  PISC  report 
EUR  6371,  Volumes  I  to V. 
/28/  CEC  study report. 
Assessment  of  residual  stresses  in  reactor  pressure  components 
and  their  significance  in  relation  to  non  destructive  testing 
(NDT). 
Support  of  PISC  II programme. 
November  1983. 
/29/  The  use  of  acoustic  emission  methods  as  aids  to  the  structural 
integrity assessment  of nuclear power  plants 
International Journal of Pressure Vessels  and  Piping 
21  (1985)  157-207 
/30/  The  significance  of  residual  stresses  in  relation  to  the 
integrity of  LWR  pressure vessels 
International Journal of Pressure Vessels  and  Piping 
Vol.  17,  N°4,  1984 
/31/ Collection  and  comparison  of  the  existing  guidelines  and 
provisions  on  design,  manufacture,  testing,  and  inspection  of 
steel reactor pressure boilers, Volumes  I, II, III 
EUR-Report  5402 
/32/  CEC  study report. 
Human  factors  and  man-machine  interaction.  A  comprehensive  and 
critical  survey  classification  and  analysis  of  current  relevant 
work.  November  1984. 
/33/  CEC  study report. 
Human  factors  and  man-machine  interaction.  Application  of 
methods  of  expert  systems  to  control  and  safety  functions  in 
NPPs.  1985. 
/34/  CEC  study report. 
Human  factors  principles relevant  to modelling of human  errors in 
abnormal  conditions of nuclear and major hazardous  installations. 
November  1985. 
/35/  CEC  study report. 
Human  factors  and  man-machine  interaction.  Application  of 
artifical intelligence to  control and  safety functions  in nuclear 
power  plant early fault recognition.  November  1985. /36/  CEC  study report. 
Comparison of national specifications,  regulations  and  guidelines 
relating to the  reactor protection system. 
1982. 
/37/ Protection of NPPs  against  loss of electricity power  supply. 
Synthesis report,  1983. 
/38/  CEC  study report 
Authorisation  procedure  for  the  construction  and  operation  of 
nuclear  installations  within  the  EC  member  states,  including 
supervision and  control. 
EUR  5284,  Edition  1978. 
/39/  Commission  of  the European  Communities. 
Nuclear Science and  Technology. 
Qualification,  training,  licensing  and  retraining  of  operating 
shift personnel  in nuclear  power  plants. 
Report  EUR  10118  EN,  1985. 
/40/ Qualification,  training,  licensing/authorisation  and  retraining 
of operating personnel  in nuclear power  plants. 
Note-worthy  topics  identified  by  evaluation  of  the  practices  in 
countries  of  the  European Community. 
Proposal  for a  Communication  from  the  Commission  to  the  Council. 
/41/ Reporting of  abnormal  occurrences 
Status report.  Revision  1,  February  1979. 
/42/  Commission  of the  European  Communities. 
Comparison  of  the  design  specifications  for  loss  of  coolant 
accident  in  light  water  reactors  applicable  in  the  EC  Member 
States and  the USA.  · 
CEC  Study report,  July  1979. 
/43/  CEC  study report. 
Examination  of  the  scientific  and  technical  foundation  of  models 
and  scenarios used  to evaluate the radiological  consequences  of  a 
reference accident  in  PWR  reactors according  to  French rules. 
November  1983. 
/44/  CEC  study report 
Radiological  consequences  of  a  LOCA. 
Principles underlying  the  German  position. 
1980 
/45/  CEC  study report. 
The  assessment  of  hydrogen  production,  distribution  and  risk  of 
explosion  in  the  reactor  containment  as  a  consequence  of  a  LOCA 
in a  nuclear power  plant.  November  1982. 
/46/  CEC  study report 
Hydrogen mitigation. 
April  1982. 
/47/  CEC  study report. 
Distribution  of  hydrogen  and  other  gases  within  the  reactor 
containment  as  a  consequence  of  a  loss  coolant  accident  in  a 
light water reactor.  November  1983. /48/  CEC  study report. 
Expert  appraisal  and  analysis  of  relevant  global  work  on  light 
water  reactor  severe  accident  phenomena  concerning  degraded  core 
and  severe fuel  damage  conditions.  November  1984. 
/49/  CEC  study report. 
The  source  term. 
November  1985. 
/50/  CEC  study report  • 
An  evaluation  of  its  impact  on  safety. 
. Aerosol  behaviours  in  a  condensing  steam  environment.  November 
1985. 
/51/  CEC  study report. 
Aerosol  and  hydrogen  stratification  plus  leak  path  retention  in 
light water reactor containments.  November  1985 
/52/  CEC  study report. 
Chemistry of fission products at high  temperatures. 
November  1985. 
/53/  CEC  study report. 
Survey of  requirements  for  therrnophysical properties arising  from 
studies of  PWR  severe core accidents.  November  1985. 
/54/  CEC  study report. 
Fluid dynamic  effects on  aerosol plate-out in light water reactor 
containments.  November  1984. 
/55/  CEC  study report. 
Fission product  source  term  phenomena. 
Acqua  iodine chemistry. 
November  1984. 
/56/  CEC  study report. 
Fission product  source  term. 
Chemical  form  and  release  of  fission  products  at  elevated 
temperature. 
Report  EUR  10345  EN. 
/57/  CEC  study report. 
Fission  product  transport  and  aerosol  behaviour  in  the  contain-
ment  at  various  stages  of  a  severe  accident  in  a  light  water 
reactor,  with  special  emphasis  on  their  possible  resuspension 
fr.om  sump  and walls. 
November  1984 
/58/  CEC  study report. 
Retention  of  fission  product  aerosols  due  to  diffusiophoretic 
deposition  in  the  containment  atmosphere  of  a  light water reactor 
under post meltdown  condition. 
November  1984. 
/59/  Benchmark  exercise on  dose  estimation in a  regulatory context. 
Outline of calculation programme. 
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/60/ Use'of risk concept in safety analysis 
Synthesis report WGl-79/PS.  March  1980 ( 
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/61/ Definition of quality assurance criteria. 
(Preparation of  a  special publication) 
September  1986. 
/62/  The  technical basis for emergency planning  and  preparedness in EC 
countries. 
Report  EUR  9623  EN,  1985. 
/63/  CEC  study report 
Les  plans  d'urgence  interne  dans  les  pays  membres  de  la 
Communaute  Europeenne. 
Novembre  1985. 
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November  1986. 
'  ... ANNEX  IV 
,REFERENCE  LIST  OF  ACCIDENTS  FOR  LIQUID  METAL  FAST  BREEDER 
. REACTORS  CONSIDERED  FOR  SAFETY  CRITERIA  AND  GUIDELINES 
Primary reactivity accidents 
Incorrect withdrawal of  absorber 
- Ejection of absorber 
Core  loading error 
- Reduction in sodium inlet temperature 
- Addition of moderator 
Voiding by  gas 
- Variations of core geometry 
General  cooling accidents 
- Pump  failure 
- Failure in operation of valves in main 
coolant circuits 
- Loss  of  primary sodium  (loss  in vessel,  break 
of primary piping) 
- Leak in intermediate heat  exchangers 
Failure of normal heat rejection system 
- Failure of decay heat rejection system 
-Failure of.diagrid allowing bypass of core  flow 
Subassembly cooling accidents 
Incorrect positioning of a  subassembly 
- Inlet or outlet blockage  in subassembly 
Local  blockage  or cooling defects within 
a  subassembly 
- Pin failure  and  damage  propagation 
within a  subassembly and  the core 
Accidents outside the core 
- Fuel handling accidents 
- Sodium-water reaction in steam generators 
- Primary and  secondary  sodium fires 
- Conventional fires 
- Radioactivity release  from  leakage of active 
systems 
Initiating causes external to the station 
- Natural occurences 
- Airplane or other missiles 
- Explosions  and hazardous effects of off-site 
gaseous releases 
- Sabotage l 
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ANNEX  V 
LIQUID  METAL  FAST  BREEDER  REACTOR 
CODES  AND  STANDARDS  ACTIVITIES 
LIST  OF  STUDIES  AND  PUBLICATIONS 
1.  MANUFACTURING  STANDARDS,  QUALITY  CONTROL  AND  IN-SERVICE  INSPECTION 
TITLE  PUBLICATION 
"Qualitative  comparison  of national  standards  which  are  used  for 
the  construction  of  FBRs  in  Belgium,  France,  Germany,  Great-
Britain,  Italy  and  the  Netherlands",  WGCS/XII/1105/79.~  June 
1977.  (INTAT  77-73) 
"Comparative  analysis  of  National  Standards  in  the  areas  of weld 
procedure  test,  NDT  and  inspection  of  components,  appropriate  to 
reactor construction in the EEC",  WGCS/XII/910/79,  November  1979. 
"A  quantitative  analysis  of  the  disparities  between  national 
fabrication  requirements  relating  to  weld  materials  and  weld 
seams",  WGCS/XII/919/80,  March  1981. 
"Quantitative  analysis  of  National  Standards  :  Welding  super-
vision,  Testing  of ·Welders,  Testing  of  Specimen  Welds,  Measure 
adopted  to  prevent  the  incorrect  use  of  welding  materials". 
WGCS-1/XII/877/81,  October  1981. 
"Quantitative  analysis  of  national  standards,  relating  to  test 
procedures  on  semi-finished  products  and  weld  seams", 
WGCS-1/XII/803/83,  November  1981. 
"Study  of  the  Present  Development  Status  in  the  In-Service 
Inspection  of  Sodium  Cooled  Fast  Breeder  Reactors", 
WGCS-1/XII/315/82,  December  1981. 
"Quantitative  analysis  of  national  standards  in  the  areas  of  NDT 
of  semi-finished products",  WGCS-1/XII/756/82,  December  1982. 
"Quantitative  analysis  of  national  standards,  relating  to  test 
procedures  on  components",  WGCS-1/XII/802/83,  September  1983. 
"Comparative analysis of quality assurance  systems which effecti-
vely control,  review and  verify the quality of  components  manufac-
tured  for  liquid  metal  cooled  fast  breeder  reactors  within  the 
EEC",  WGCS/XII/806/83,  October  1983. 
"Quantitative analysis of national standards,  relating to defini-
tion of  component  requirements,  WGCS-1/XII/484/82,  December  1983. 
"Acceptance  criteria  for 
WGCS-1/XII/178/85,  March  1985. 
NDT  on  welded  joints", 
EUR 
10123  EN "Comparison of ultrasonic testing methods  for austenitic steels", 
WGCS-1/XII/745/84,  June  1985. 
"Rapport  sur  1'  ctat  de  1' art  concernant  les  revetements  durs  de 
composants  pour reacteurs rapides",  Avril  1985. 
"Analyse  quantitative  des  normes  nationales  relatives  aux  essais 
de  reception de produits d'apport  pour  soudage".  Octobre  1985. 
"Correlation  des  normes  relatives  a  !'agrement  des  produits 
d'apport pour  soudage",  Octobre  1985. 
"Correlation des  normes  relatives aux  techniques  de  controles non 
destructifs", Novembre  1985. 
"Acceptance  criteria  for  flaws  under  the  conditions  of  non-
destructive  testing methods",  April  1986. 
"Comparative  analysis  of  quality assurance  in  the  manufacture  of 
the vessel,  pump,  cold  trap",  May  1986. 
2.  STRUCTURAL  ANALYSIS 
"Comparative  Theoretical  and  Experimentation  Analyses  of  Bench-
mark  Problems",  ITB  78.127,  December  1978. 
"Elasto-Plastic Benchmark Calculations - Step  I.  Verification of 
the Numerical Accuracy of the Computer  Programmes". 
"Benchmark Calculation Programme  concerning Typical LMFBR  Struc-
tures",  ASME,  PVP-vol.  66,  1983  Pressure  Vessel  I,  Piping  Confe-
rence  & Exhibit,  June  27-July  2  1982, .Orlando,  Florida. 
"Simplified  Methods  of  Cyclic  Structural  Analysis  within . the 
Creep Range- Deformation Assessment",  July  1982. 
"Seismic  Benchmark  Calculations  Fluid.  Structure  Interaction", 
January  1983. 
"Shakedown  and  Ratchetting below the Creep  Range",  June  1983. 
"Ratchetting in the creep  range". 
"Application de !'analyse limite et de  la methode  de  ia con-
trainte  de  reference  aux  caissons  mecanosoudes  raid  is",  Juin 
1983. 
"Comparison of the methods  of  seismic analysis applicable to  the 
faGt  reactor components  in the  EEC  countries", 
doc.  WGCS-2/XII/893/83,  September  1983. 
EUR  9874  EN 
EUR  8013  EN 
EUR  8702  EN 
EUR  9876  EN 
EUR  8460  FR 
EUR  10586 
EN/FR ;.-t_  .. 
i  -
t  -~ 
f 
"A  state-of-the-art review of inelastic  (static & dynamic)  piping 
analysis  methods,  with  particular applications  to  LMFBR",  Novem-
ber  1983. 
"Constitutive modelling  in  the  range  of  inelastic deformations", 
doc.  n"  68.09030  •. 6,  October  1984. 
"State-of-the-art  report  on  fracture  mechanics  for  fast  breeder 
reactors"  (Fracture  below  the  creep  range) ,  doc.  n"  MDD  84. 099, 
December  1984. 
"Benchmark  study of shear buckling of  a  cylindrical vessel". 
September  1985. 
"Fracture  mechanics  relevant  to  LMFBR  in  the  creep  range", 
October  1985. 
3.  MATERIALS  SPECIFICATIONS 
"Comparison of Type  316  ss qualities in the CEC  for high  tempera-
ture application",  Activity 3,  reference  document  n"  23,  1978. 
"Comparative study of  the  tensile properties of  Type  316  Steel", 
1980. 
"Comparison  of  extrapolated stress  rupture  values  of  British  and 
German  Type  316  rupture data",  report  ITB78.35,  1978 • 
•  "Comparison  and  creep  rupture strength extrapolation methods with 
application of data for AISI  316  from  Italy, France,  UK  and  FRG", 
report T-ZA-5828,  1981. 
"Comparison  of  tensile properties of  9-12%  Cr  steels",  Part  1, 
Data files,  1981. 
"Comparison of  tensile properties of  9-12%  Cr  steels", Part  2. 
Assessment,  1983. 
"Comparison of  low  cycle fatigue data  on  2  1/4 CrMo  steels", 
December  1981. 
"A  review of creep-fatigue interaction on  AISI  304  and  316 
stainless steel",  Ispra Tech.  Note  1.07. 01.81. 34,  1981. 
"Joint exercise to  compare  fatigue  crack growth  data obtained  on 
Type  304/316 stainless steel",  Document  INTAT  55.04973.8,  1981. 
"Joint  exercise  to  compare  creep  crack  growth  data  for  Types  304 
and  316  stainless steels",  September  1982. 
"The  tensile p'roperties  of austenitic steel weld  metal",  Doc. 
ref.  3742,  September  1982. 
EUR  10592  EN 
EUR  7797  EN 
EUR  7796  EN 
EUR  9875  EN 
EUR  9875  EN 
EUR  8501  EN 
JRC  ISPRA 
EUR  8502  EN 
EUR  10125  EN "The stress rupture properties of austenitic steel weld metal", 
Doc.  ref.  3743,  September  1982. 
"Stress  rupture  behaviour  of  AISI  Type  316  steel  in  the  creep 
regime",  ref.  n°  T-ZA  5831,  1982. 
"Compilation  of  European  Data  on  creep/fatigue  interaction  on 
austenitic steelsn,  D Tech.  SMRA  (82)  1202,  December  1982. 
"A  review on  the creep  crack growth on AISI  304  and  316  stainless 
steels".  Doc.  JRC/1.07 .01.83.12,  July  1983. 
"Second  phase  joint  exercise  to  evaluate  creep  crack  growth  data 
for  types  304  and  316  stainless  steels  obtained  by  CEC  Member 
States",  February  1984. 
"Comparison  of  low-cycle  fatigue  data  of  2  1/4  %  CrMo  steels, 
Part II -Creep fatigue data",  September  1983. 
"The  inelastic  behaviour  of  welded  joints  of  steel  AISI  304  and 
316  at high  temperature",  December  1983. 
"Compilation  of  European  data  on  creep  fatigue  interaction  on 
austenitic  stainless  steels.  Report  II.  Creep  fatigue  evalua-
tion."  Note  technique D.  Tech.  (84)  1316,  April  1984. 
"Comparison of material properties specifications of austenitic 
steels  in  fast  breeder  reactor  technologies".,  Doc.  n° 
098.64/020/M/093,  BN  8412-02,  December  1984. 
"Comparison  of  fast  breeder  reactor  allowable  stresses  for 
austenitic steels".  Doc.  n°  3432,  November  1984. 
"Fracture  toughness  properties  of  austenitic  stainless  mate-
rials", Report  1  and  2,  April  1985. 
"Surveillance  programmes  and  requirements  for  LMFBR  systems", 
September  1985. 
"Fracture  toughness  of  austenitic  steel 
December  1985. 
round  robin  tests", 
"Comparison  of  material  property  specifications  of  ferritic 
steels in Fast Breeder Reactor Technology",  January  1986. 
"Stress  relaxation analysis  of  austenitic stainless  steels",  May 
1986. 
4.  CLASSIFICATION  OF  COMPONENTS 
"Sodium  Cooled  Fast Reactors Classification of Mechanical Systems 
and  Components",  R403-AG4(1)HB,  June  1983. 
EUR  10124  EN 
JRC  ISPRA 
EUR  10126  EN 
r - , 